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Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard
optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a
technologically feasible attack, namely the time-shift attack, against a commercial QKD system. Our
result shows that, contrary to popular belief, an eavesdropper, Eve, has a non-negligible probability
(∼4%) to break the security of the system. Eve’s success is due to the well-known detection efficiency
loophole in the experimental testing of Bell inequalities. Therefore, the detection efficiency loophole
plays a key role not only in fundamental physics, but also in technological applications such as QKD.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] provides a
method to share a secret key between legitimate users
called “Alice” (the sender) and “Bob” (the receiver). The
unconditional security of QKD has ben rigorously proved
based on the laws of physics [3, 4]. Even imperfect practi-
cal QKD systems have also been proved secure assuming
some semi-realistic models [5, 6]. The decoy method [7]
was proposed to dramatically improve the performance
of a practical QKD system. Our group has implemented
the decoy method experimentally over 15km and 60km of
telecom fibers [8]. Incidentally, QKD has found real-life
applications in a recent Swiss election [9].
Recently, there has been a lot of theoretical interest on
the connection between the security of QKD and funda-
mental physical principles such as the violation of Bell’s
inequality and the no-signaling constraint [10] on space-
like observables. An ultimate goal, which has not yet
been achieved [11], is to construct a device-independent
security proof. As is well-known, the experimental test-
ing of Bell’s inequality often suffers from the detection
efficiency loophole. A fair sampling assumption may save
the day. However, as we will demonstrate below, rather
surprisingly, the low detection efficiency of practical de-
tectors not only violates the fair sampling assumption
that would be needed in security proofs based on Bell-
inequality violation, but also gives Eve (an eavesdropper)
a powerful handle to break the security of a practical
QKD system. Therefore, the detection efficiency loop-
hole is of both conceptual and practical interest.
Our work is an illustration of general physical limita-
tions, rather than a particular technological weakness.
Indeed, a practical QKD system often includes two or
more detectors. It is virtually impossible to manufac-
ture identical detectors in practice. As a result, the two
detectors of the same QKD system will exhibit different
detection efficiencies as functions of either one or a com-
bination of variables in the time, frequency, polarization,
and/or spatial domains. If Eve manipulates a signal in
these variables, she could effectively exploit the detection
efficiency loophole to break the security of a QKD sys-
tem. In our experiment, we consider Eve’s manipulation
of the time variable. Our work demonstrates the gen-
eral problem of detection efficiency loophole in practical
QKD systems.
Recently, quantum hacking has attracted much scien-
tific and popular attention [12]. Makarov et al. proposed
a faked-state attack and studied its feasibility with their
home-made QKD system [13, 14]. Unfortunately, this
attack is an intercept-resend attack which is hard to im-
plement in practice. Therefore, this attack has never
been successfully demonstrated in experiments. Kim et
al. simulated an entanglement probe attack on the BB84
protocol [15]. However, it serves to demonstrate the secu-
rity rather than the insecurity of QKD systems because
this attack has already been considered in standard se-
curity proofs. A study of the information leakage due to
public announcement of the timing information by Bob
was reported [16]. However, Bob does not need to make
such an announcement in practice. In summary, despite
numerous efforts, up till now, no one has even come close
to hacking successfully a practical QKD system, let alone
a commercial one.
Here, we present the first experimental demonstration
of a successful hacking against a commercial QKD sys-
tem. It is highly surprising to break a well-designed com-
mercial QKD system with only current technology. Our
work shows clearly the slippery nature of QKD [17] and
forces us to re-examine the security of practical QKD
systems and its applications in real-life. The attack we
use is the time-shift attack proposed by us in [18]. The
time-shift attack is simple to implement as it does not
involve any measurement or state preparation by Eve.
The time-shift attack exploits the detection efficiency
mismatch between the two detectors in a QKD system in
the time domain. In QKD security proofs (e.g. ref.[5]),
a standard assumption is that the detection efficiencies
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(b)A conceptual schematic of Eve’s
attack. HOS: high-speed optical
switch.
FIG. 1: Conceptual drawings.
for the bits “0” and “1” are equal. However, its validity
is questionable [13, 14, 18]. For example, a typical time-
dependence of the detection efficiency of a practical fiber-
based QKD system (with InGaAs avalanche photo diodes
(APDs) of telecom wavelength operating at gated Geiger
mode) is illustrated in Fig. 1(a). Note that, at time A the
detection efficiency for the bit “0” is much higher than
that for the bit “1”, while the opposite case can be found
at B. The detection efficiency mismatch can only be
confidently removed if the efficiencies are constant in time
domain. We remark that even non-gated single-photon
detectors such as Si APDs exhibit detection efficiency
mismatch due to intrinsic dead-time [19].
The idea of the time-shift attack is simple. Eve can
shift the arrival time of each signal to either A or B
randomly with probabilities pA and pB = 1− pA respec-
tively. Eve can carefully choose pA to keep the number
of Bob’s detection events of “0”s and “1”s equal. Since
Bob’s measurement result will be biased towards “0” or
“1” depending on the time shift (A or B), Eve can “steal”
information without alerting Alice or Bob. A conceptual
setup to launch the time-shift attack is shown in Fig.
1(b). Eve can choose to connect Alice and Bob through
either a longer arm or a shorter arm so as to shift the
signal around time A (a negative shift), or around time
B (a positive shift).
The success of our demonstration is a big surprise be-
cause in our experiment, Eve cannot perform a quan-
tum non-demolition (QND) measurement on the photon
number or compensate any loss introduced by the attack,
while Eve can have arbitrarily advanced technology in se-
curity proofs. In other words, our practical Eve is much
weaker than the eavesdropper in security proofs. It is sur-
prising to see an attack which can be implemented with
current technology (e.g., the time-shift attack) can do
better than even the QND attack, which is significantly
beyond current technology.
The experiment is performed on top of a modified
commercial ID-500 QKD setup [20] manufactured by id
Quantique. The schematic of our experimental setup is
shown in Fig. 2.
The crucial issues in the experiment are the activation
times of the two detectors (APDs in Fig. 2). The com-
mercial QKD system has a built-in calibration program
which sets the activation time of each detector indepen-
dently. The activation times of the two detectors differ
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FIG. 2: The schematic of experimental demonstration of the
time-shift attack. Inside Jr. Bob/Jr. Alice: components
in Bob/Alice’s package of id Quantique QKD system. Our
modifications: LD: narrow pulse laser diode; OVDL: opti-
cal variable delay line; DCF: dispersion compensating fiber.
Original QKD system: APD: avalanche photon diode; ΦA/B:
phase modulator; PBS: polarizing beam splitter; PD: classical
photo detector; DL: delay line; FM: faraday mirror.
slightly due to the discrepancies in the lengths of the
fibers connecting them. Ideally, to minimize the detec-
tion efficiency mismatch, the difference of the activation
times should take a constant value. However, at times
the difference in the activation times as set by the built-in
calibration program deviates from this value, suggesting
a larger efficiency mismatch. We observed the maximum
value of the deviations as ∆ ∼ 100ps. To get statistics of
this deviation, we ran the built-in calibration program for
2844 times, during which the deviation reaches ∆ for 106
times. This is, the detection efficiency mismatch reaches
its maximum value with a probability of ∼4%.
After the calibration of the activation times, we use the
optical variable delay line (OVDL in Fig. 2) to manually
shift the arrival time of the signals, looking for instants
that show large efficiency mismatch.
There are several challenges in this experiment. In our
setup, the gating window for the detectors (APDs in Fig.
2) is ∼500ps, which is close to the laser pulse width. This
will “blur” the efficiency mismatch. However, the com-
mercial QKD system is not immune from the time-shift
attack as Eve can simply apply standard pulse compres-
sion technique to the bright pulses sent from Bob to Alice
in the channel (e.g. [21]). In our experiment, we replaced
the original laser source by a PicoQuant laser diode (LD
in Fig. 2) with pulse width ∼100ps, which is equivalent
to the compression scheme mentioned above [22].
Another challenge is the chromatic dispersion in the
fiber which broadens the laser pulses. We thus installed
∼ 2 km dispersion compensating fiber (DCF in Fig. 2) .
Ideally, Eve can pre-chirp the bright pulses that are sent
from Bob to Alice. Note that both the pre-chirping and
pulse compression can be done on the bright pulses from
Bob to Alice without touching the quantum signal sent
from Alice to Bob. Therefore, neither process would in-
crease the channel loss when Alice sends quantum signals
to Bob. We thus view the dispersion compensating fiber
(DCF in Fig. 2) as part of Alice’s local apparatus.
A third challenge is the optimization of the attack.
Na¨ıvely, Eve could simply select large shifts as they
would definitely provide substantial intrinsic detection ef-
ficiency mismatches. However, they may be suboptimal
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FIG. 3: Efficiencies of the two detectors versus time shifts.
Inset: the mismatch of detectors efficiencies (defined as
max( d0
d1
, d1
d0
)). The peak efficiencies of detectors are slightly
different, suggesting the detection efficiency has slightly
drifted since the factory setting. The data size for time
shifts with large detection efficiency mismatch (-250ps, -
200ps, 500ps, 600ps, and 650ps) is chosen to be 20.97Mbit
to acquire accurate mismatch, while the data size for other
shifts is chosen to be 1.05Mbit to speed up the experiment.
for the attack because their low intrinsic detection effi-
ciencies make the dark count significant, increasing the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) and consequently the
cost of the error correction. Therefore the task of choos-
ing the shifts is non-trivial. The time-shift attack will
introduce additional loss as the signals are shifted to the
low-efficiency region. Nonetheless, since Alice and Bob’s
channel may not be a straight line and there may be ad-
ditional loss due to components such as optical switches,
in practice Eve could lower the channel loss by for exam-
ple replacing existing channel with a better one without
alerting Alice and Bob. So, the power of time-shift attack
may be stronger than what one na¨ıvely thinks.
We demonstrated the time-shift attack in the following
way: first, the activation times of detectors were deter-
mined by the built-in program; second, the arrival times
of the signals were shifted at a step of 50 ps (a narrower
step was not necessary as the pulse width was ∼100 ps);
third, at each shifted time, Alice and Bob exchanged key
at an average photon number (at Alice’s output) of 0.1;
fourth, Bob calculated the counts of each detector and
the error rates. The entire experiment after each calibra-
tion spanned ∼15 minutes.
In real attack Eve should apply an alternative tech-
nique to obtain the efficiency mismatch as she has no
access to Bob’s apparatus [18]: she can gradually shift
a small subset of the signals and set them to 0 or 1 and
deduce the amount of the mismatch from Bob’s detection
announcement. Our experimental results show that the
mismatch is stable throughout the 15-min span of our
experiment. Therefore Eve has sufficient time to obtain
the mismatch information and launch her attack.
The experimentally measured detector efficiencies are
shown in Fig. 3 for the case where the deviation in ac-
tivation times takes the maximal value ∆tm. It shows
substantial detection efficiency mismatch. In particular,
two shifts with large mismatches are found as in Table I.
The security of the QKD system is analyzed in the
following way: one can estimate an upper bound KU of
the key length given the efficiency mismatch known by
Eve and a lower bound KL ignoring the time-shift attack
(as Alice and Bob cannot detect the attack). If the upper
bound is less than the lower bound (i.e., KL > KU ),
there must be some information leaked to Eve unknown
to Alice or Bob.
We consider that Alice sends N bits to Bob, among
which the same basis are used for N˜ bits and Bob de-
tects N˜Q signals (Q is the overall gain). Here we assume
that infinite decoy state protocol and one-way classical
communications for post-processing are used.
Lower bound : The error correction will consume
rEC = N˜Qf(E)H2(E) (1)
bits, where E is the overall QBER, H2(x) is the standard
binary Shannon entropy function, f(x) is the error cor-
rection inefficiency [23]. The net key length ignoring the
time-shift attack is thus [5, 24–26]
KL = −rEC + N˜{Q1[1−H2(e1)] +Q0} (2)
where Qi and ei are the gain and the QBER for the
signals with i photons sent by Alice.
Upper bound : an upper bound is given by [27]
KU = −rEC + N˜ ·Q ·
∑
i={A,B};j={0,1}
[Pr{Z2 = j|Z1 = i}
· Pr{Z1 = i} ·H2(Pr{X = 0|Z1 = i, Z2 = j})] (3)
where X , Z1, and Z2 are classical random variables rep-
resenting Alice’s initial bit, Eve’s choice of the time shift
for each bit, and the basis information, respectively.
TABLE I: Experimental results.
(a)The number of detections.
Label Shift (ps) d0 d1 N
A -250 10992 1541 20,966,400
B 500 1231 4059 20,966,400
(b)The number of detections given that Alice and Bob use
the same basis. N˜ = 10, 481, 280 bits. Y is Bob’s bit value.
Time shift A (−250ps)
Z2 X Y = 1 Y = 0
0 1 336 139
0 0 65 2557
1 1 333 120
1 0 59 2634
QBER: 0.06135
Time shift B (500ps)
Z2 X Y = 1 Y = 0
0 1 979 31
0 0 41 260
1 1 1022 37
1 0 35 279
QBER: 0.05365
(c)Parameters for computing the key length.
Theoretical
f(x) pA
1.22 23.0%
Experimental
µ Y0 d0/1 E KU KL
0.1 2.26× 10−5 3479 5.68% 1131bit 1297bit
4The upper bound and the lower bound of the key rate
can then be calculated from Eqs. (1)-(3) using data in Ta-
ble I. The calculation results are shown in Table I(c). Y0
is determined experimentally. Note that no double clicks
were observed in our experiment.The fact that KL > KU
clearly indicates the success of the attack [28].
We conclude with a few general lessons. First, counter-
measures often exist for known attacks. For instance, the
“four-state measurement” proposal (which suggests that
for phase-encoding BB84 protocol, Bob’s phase modula-
tion is randomly selected from a set of four values instead
of two values) can shield the time-shift attack. Second,
the implementation of a counter-measure may open up
new security loopholes. For instance, the four-state mea-
surement scheme will be vulnerable to combined large
pulse [29] and time-shift attack. Once an attack is known,
the prevention is usually easy. However, we have a third
lesson: unanticipated attacks are most dangerous.
The time-shift attack is demonstrated on a bi-
directional system. However, it is a threat to a general
class of QKD systems (including uni-directional setup)
and protocols (eg. [2]). Moreover, we are concerned with
the general physical limitations of detection efficiency
loophole, rather than a specific technological problem.
The time-shift attack can be easily generalized to spatial-
, spectral-, and polarization-shift attack exploiting the
efficiency mismatch in the corresponding domains. On
the practical side, our work highlights the significance of
side channel attacks [30, 31] in QKD. Historically, the
existence of a side-channel attack went back to the first
QKD experiment, which was unconditionally secure to
any eavesdropper who happens to be deaf!
In summary, we report the first experimental demon-
stration of a technologically feasible attack against a com-
mercial QKD system. Our results clearly show that even
QKD systems built by trustworthy manufacturers may
contain subtle flaws that will allow Eve to break it with
current technologies. The success of the attack highlights
the importance to battle-test practical QKD systems and
work on security proofs with testable assumptions. It is
remarkable that the detection efficiency loophole plays
a key role in both fundamental physics and technologi-
cal applications (e.g., QKD systems) [31]. How to close
the detection efficiency loophole and side-channel attacks
will be an important subject for future investigation.
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